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Abstract
Our experiment challenges the standard, social preference, interpretation of choices
in the double blind dictator game. In our bilateral treatment both groups are endowed
with $20, any fraction of which can be passed to a randomly determined player in the
other group. Because both groups have $20 to start, neither inequality aversion nor
altruism should motivate people to give. Despite this, the allocations in this treatment
are identical to our replication of the standard double blind game implying that altru-
ism might be the wrong interpretation of giving. Instead, we hypothesize that giving
might be driven by participants coming to the lab ready “to play.” The fact that there
is a strong correlation between participant responses to an attention deﬁcit, hyper-
activity disorder questionnaire and both the rate and level of giving provides direct
support for this hypothesis. We also show that having players earn their endowments
attenuates the bias.




Psychologists have worried about “demand eﬀects” since the Hawthorne experiments in the
1920s and 1930s in which the investigators realized that much of the change in productivity
of the young women at a Western Electric assembly plant was related to the simple fact
that they were participating in an experiment (oethlisberger and Dickson (1939). Since then
demand eﬀects in psychology have been associated with people under examination seeing
themselves as research assistants who (mostly) want to help the experimenters. These junior
research assistants try to ﬁgure out what the experiment is about and act in ways that conﬁrm
hypotheses. In the Hawthorne study, it was obvious that the researchers were looking for the
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1determinants of productivity and the participants did what they could to help even if they
did not always guess correctly on the sign of the comparative static: in one illumination study
the investigators recorded stable productivity even as the amount of light on the shop ﬂoor
was reduced to “an amount equal to that on an ordinary moonlight night” (Roethlisberger
and Dickson, 1939:17).
Economists believe that they have attenuated this sort of demand eﬀect by paying people
in experiments based on the actions that they take. At a minimum, pay for performance in
economic experiments increases the cost to participants for acting contrary to their material
incentives. However, economists worry about a slightly diﬀerent demand eﬀect that may still
bias behavior even after we make it costly to behave as junior research assistants. Economists
worry that participants view their experience in the lab as a potentially repeated game and
that the probability of playing the next stage (and making more money) depends on how
one plays in the current stage (Hoﬀman et al., 1996). If you are a “nice” player today, you
will be more likely to be invited back to play again. This sort of demand eﬀect explains
why economists began running “double blind” experiments in which players knew that they
could never be identiﬁed and so there was no point in investing in a reputation as a nice
player.
Economists now appear conﬁdent that they have eliminated demand eﬀects by paying
for performance and by using double blind procedures. However, we have uncovered another
bias that is particularly insidious because it is more likely to be present in experiments that,
on ﬁrst reading, seem clever and clean. An example using one of the most common economic
experiments, the dictator game (DG), makes the point. In the typical DG one player, the
dictator, is given an amount of money and told that she can send as much as she wants to
another anonymous participant, the recipient, and keep the rest. Clearly there is no incentive
for a selﬁsh person to send anything, so giving money is often interpreted as a measure
of social preference — speciﬁcally altruism — although giving has also been interpreted as
demonstrating inequality aversion. These interpretations may have been premature because
early versions of the dictator game were often tainted by demand eﬀects. For example, the
DGs reported on in Forsythe et al. (1994) were conducted single blind and in one treatment
the payoﬀs were purposely hypothetical to test for the psychological notion of a demand
eﬀect. Indeed, both biases seem to be present because Forsythe et al. found signiﬁcantly
more fairness in the hypothetical DG and Hoﬀman et al. (1996) (HMcS) showed that oﬀers
are considerable smaller in the double blind DG. While oﬀers fall when the stakes are real
and the experiment is conducted double blind, approximately one third of the people in
HMcS’s experiment still allocated some money to the recipient. The question is whether the
behavior of this residual third can be attributed to altruism or is something else at work?
Put yourself in the role of the dictator in a double blind DG played for real stakes. You
understand the instructions (it doesn’t get much more straightforward), you understand that
there is a one-for-one tradeoﬀ between sending and keeping money, and you understand (and
hopefully believe) that there is no way for the experimenter to identify what you have done.
So why would you send any money? Maybe you do feel altruistic towards your partner, but
why? You are both very likely to be college students which means you are both also likely
to be relatively aﬄuent and even if you did want to donate money to someone who might
really need it, you can’t do so for sure because your donation will be randomly assigned to
someone in the other room. Alternatively, you might be inequality averse Fehr and Schmidt
2(1999) and therefore you may want to rectify the fact that you were given money and the
recipient was not. However, if you are that concerned with inequality, why would you not
consider the inequality in personal wealth among all the participants in the session? If you
use cues to assess where you are in the participant income distribution, you could easily ﬁnd
yourself in a situation in which you should give away all the money, but this almost never
happens.
So why then do you send money? Our research suggests that people may send money in
the DG just because they came to the experiment intent on “playing.” That is, because they
invested the time responding to recruiters and getting to the lab, they want to do something
and ﬁnd it very hard to do the equivalent of nothing, in this case to keep all the money. In
fact, our data suggests that after employing the standard procedures to eliminate demand
eﬀects, the remaining third of our participants may allocate money to the recipient because
they come to play not because they are altruistic.
How can we separate social preference reasons for giving from “coming to play” reasons?
After replicating the results of HMcS, we conducted a second treatment that we call the
bilateral dictator game (BDG) in which both players are given a $20 endowment. Think about
giving in this game. Before, the myopic dictator might have focused on game wealth (and
disregarded possible diﬀerences in overall wealth) and felt altruistic towards the recipient.
But, in the bilateral game there is no reason to feel altruistic; all the other players are as
well oﬀ as you are. There is also no reason for someone sensitive to inequality to give. In
fact, inequality aversion suggests that you do not give because then you will just increase
your chances of being worse oﬀ than the recipient. The BDG played double blind eliminates
all the standard reasons for giving in the DG. What is left might be that people come to
play.
One striking feature of our data is that when we compare the distribution of allocations in
our BDG to our replication of HMcS, we ﬁnd no diﬀerence. Neither the central tendency of
the distributions nor the incidence of giving is diﬀerent. This suggests that the context-free
double blind DG played between college students in the lab is not much of a measure of social
preference. However, it might be a pretty good measure of impulsivity. To directly test this
alternative, in our post-experiment survey we had our participants respond to a standard
attention deﬁcit, hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) questionnaire. Using factor analysis to
summarize the 45 question scale, our measure of ADHD predicts both sending money and
the amount sent at better than the 5% level of conﬁdence. This result was surprising but it
provides further evidence that people come to the lab ready to play and it is very hard for
some of them to keep a grip on their impulses.
All is not lost, however. We also show how another, less common, experimental manipu-
lation cuts the incidence of impulsivity in half. In a third treatment we have our participants
stuﬀ envelopes to earn their endowments. Similar to Cherry et al. (2002), we ﬁnd that the
rate of sending money falls to less than 20% and only one person sends more than a dollar
when dictators earn their endowments.
The remainder of the paper provides the details of our research. In the next section we
describe our experimental procedures. In section 3 we discuss the distribution of behavior
in our three treatments compared to the data from HMcS. In section 4 we show that our
results are robust to the inclusion of a number of demographic factors that could aﬀect
behavior, including our measure of ADHD. In the last section we discuss the implications of
3our research.
2E x p erimental Design
Altogether, we conducted three double blind DGs with a total of 134 Middlebury College
students. In each case participants were randomly sorted into two groups who made decisions
simultaneously and independently. To connect our research to the literature, we began
by replicating the double blind conditions of HMcS. In this treatment, which we call our
replication, we used instructions based on Forsythe et al. (1994) but updated the stakes
to $20.1 There were 46 participants (23 observations) in this treatment. In our second
experiment, the BDG, we eliminated all the social preference reasons for giving money by
allocating players in both groups a $20 endowment and by allowing players in both groups to
pass money. This design is similar to Ben-Ner and Putterman (2004) with a few important
diﬀerences: allocation decisions happened simultaneously, not sequentially and there was
essentially no possibility of reciprocity because each participant’s allocation was randomly
given to a person in the other group. There were 48 participants and observations in this
treatment.
The protocol of the BDG is representative. The instructions were handed out and read
aloud while all the participants were in the same room. To answer the few questions that
arose, the experimenters simply reiterated the appropriate passage from the text. Partic-
ipants were then randomly sorted into two groups and the groups were taken to diﬀerent
large classrooms. One at a time, participants were given an opaque envelope containing $20
in cash and a slip with a participant number. They were then told to go to an adjoining
room where they were to privately remove any money that they did not want to pass to
someone in the other room along with the slip containing their participant number. To
assure anonymity, they were told to not show their participant number to anyone, including
the monitors. On the way back into the room, they deposited their envelopes into a large
box. Before they returned to their seats, they were given a survey to ﬁll out as the other
participants made their choices. The last part of the survey was to ﬁll out an attention
deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) scale borrowed from Young (2004).2 When everyone
was ﬁnished, the box containing the allocations was brought into the hall where the transfers
were recorded (the participant numbers were written on the inside ﬂap of the envelopes).
After everyone was done with the survey, the boxes were brought to the opposite room and
the participants were randomly assigned envelopes as they left. Unless a player revealed his
or her participant number, there would be no way to match individuals with their behavior.
In this sense each treatment was double blind anonymous.
In the last, earned endowment, treatment, 40 participants performed a real eﬀort task to
earn their endowments before they took part in the BDG. The production task was to fold,
staple, and address ﬂyers that would be sent via campus mail to other Middlebury students.
To keep interactions among the participants to a minimum, production was done individually
and in silence. To prevent income eﬀects, each participant received a ﬂat rate of $20 for a
half hour of work. The production task was completely separate from the BDG in that no
1Sample instructions appear in the appendix.
2This scale also appears in the appendix.
4mention of the BDG was made until after the production task was ﬁnished. Further, the
production task began after randomly splitting the participants into two groups to minimize
any interactions among the potential dictators and recipients.
The full Young (2004) ADHD scale is composed of 112 questions scored on a 5-point Likert
scale varying from “never” to “most of the time.” We implemented the 45 question abridged
version used to diagnose ADHD. This scale includes 25 items that relate to inattention,
11 items that relate to impulsivity, and 9 items relating to hyperactivity. As in Young
(2004), we summarize the responses of our participants by calculating the factor loadings on
the 45 items. In our implementation, the ﬁve items that were assigned the highest scores
were: Q3 Have you been inattentive, easily distracted, Q5 Have you had diﬃculty sustaining
attention, Q10 Have you been reluctant to do tasks that require sustained mental eﬀort,
Q15 Have you ﬁdgeted with your hands or feet, or squirmed in your seat, and Q24 Have you
had diﬃculty concentrating? These ﬁve items also received relatively large scores in Young’s
implementation.
3D a t a O v e r v i e w
The pooled data from our experiment is summarized in Table 1. The mean allocation was less
than a dollar (77 cents to be exact), however the allocation ranged from nothing to $10 which
was half the initial endowment. As another measure of behavior, 30% of our participants
sent at least one dollar. The remaining rows in Table 1 provide summary statistics from our
survey. The average participant was 20.59 years old, had a grade point average of 3.43 and
1.35 siblings. Thirty-nine percent of our participants were female, 57% percent were ﬁrst
born, 56% were economics majors, and 55% worked part time during the school year. As for
the ADHD scale, we report the orthogonal varimax rotation resulting from a factor analysis
of the 45 questions.
 
Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation
Min Max
Amount Sent 111 0.77 1.82 0 10
Send? 111 0.30 0.46 0 1
Grade Point Average (GPA) 111 3.43 0.29 2.65 3.96
Combined SAT Score 111 1381 91 1100 1570
Female 111 0.39 0.49 0 1
Number of Siblings 111 1.35 1.04 0 6
First Born 111 0.57 0.50 0 1
Age 111 20.59 1.14 18 23
Economics Major 111 0.56 0.50 0 1
Work Part Time 111 0.55 0.50 0 1
ADHD 111 0.00 0.88 -2.02 2.50
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
To illustrate the behavioral diﬀerences in our experiment, Figure 1 presents histograms of
the allocations by treatment. We report two statistics to be comprehensive in our analysis of
5any diﬀerences in the distribution of allocations. We report Wilcoxon rank sum statistics (z)
to examine diﬀerences in the central tendency of the allocations and Fisher exact chi-squared
statistics (χ2) to test for diﬀerences in the incidences of allocating a positive amount. There
are actually four histograms in Figure 1 because we also reproduce the HMcS double blind
data in the upper left cell to demonstrate the extent to which we were able to replicate
their results. In fact, our replication seen in the upper right cell was nearly perfect (z =
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Figure 1: Dictator Allocations by Treatment
Interestingly, there also does not appear to be any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between our
double blind replication of HMcS and our double blind BDG (z = 0.02,p =0 .98;χ2 =
0.05,p>0.99). The implications of this result are considerable. Given we have removed the
social preference reasons for giving money in the BDG, it appears that “coming to play” is
a better explanation of allocations in both the BDG and the regular DG. For that matter,
because we have replicated HMcS so well, the allocations in their experiment might also have
been due to impulsivity. Based on our results, one can make the case that once we have
controlled for both psychological and economic demand eﬀects in the lab, what is left over
is actually the impulsive need to act when supplied a stimulus, not altruism.
The good news, however, is that we have also discovered a viable way to remove much
of the impulsivity from the experiment. Comparing across the bottom two cells of Figure
1, we see that having participants earn their endowments reduces the incidence of giving to
17% (from 38%) and removes all but one allocation larger than a dollar. Based on our two
tests, earning one’s endowment signiﬁcantly reduces impulsivity (z = −2.27,p=0 .02;χ2 =
6.47,p=0 .03).
64D a t a A n a l y s i s
Another way to make our analysis comprehensive is to control for a collection of other
demographic factors that might aﬀect allocation decisions and to examine both the level
of giving and the incidence of giving. For example, Eckel and Grossman (1998) ﬁnd that
women in double blind dictator games give away approximately twice as much money as men.
With our lengthy exit survey we can account for the eﬀects of dictator sex and all the other
variables listed in Table 1, including our ADHD measure in which we have a particularly
interest because it allows us to directly link “coming to play” with impulsivity.
Because allocations are bounded from below we use the Tobit regressor to test the robust-
ness of our treatment diﬀerences in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. Starting with column (1)
we see that the diﬀerences between the BDG and our replication (the omitted treatment) and
between the BDG and our earned endowment treatment are robust to the inclusion of the
demographics, even though many of the demographics matter. The coeﬃcient on the BDG
is small and insigniﬁcant conﬁrming that there is no diﬀerence between behavior in the BDG
and our replication of HMcS. At the same time, the coeﬃcient on the earned endowment
treatment is large, negative and signiﬁcant (p = 0.04) indicating that participants who earn
their endowments tend to give away $2.59 less than in our replication. This important test,
however, is whether the BDG and the earned endowment point estimates are diﬀerent. The
chi-squared test suggests that they are (p =0 .03); participants give away signiﬁcantly less
money when they have to earn their endowments in the BDG. Column (1) also demonstrates
that a standard deviation increase in grade point average reduces allocations by $1.53, and
older students give away more, an additional 77 cents per year of schooling. Lastly, we
replicate Eckel and Grossman: our female participants gave away $2.28 more than our male
participants. Considering that the average allocation was $0.77, the female-male diﬀerence
is considerable.
In column (2) of Table 2 we add our measure of ADHD to the analysis of dictator alloca-
tions. Other than aﬀecting slight changes in the point estimates, adding the ADHD measure
leaves the results of column (1) unchanged. Nevertheless, allocations are highly correlated
with our ADHD measure: a standard deviation increase in ADHD increases the dictator’s
allocation by $1.42. This result provides direct evidence that more impulsive participants
give away signiﬁcantly more money in the DG. It is also interesting that the eﬀect of im-
pulsivity is not treatment speciﬁc. For example, the ordering of the treatment coeﬃcients
remains the same (the BDG and earned endowment BDG comparison is signiﬁcant at the
7% level) and the coeﬃcient on the (unreported) interactions of ADHD with treatment are
never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
All the results from our analysis of the amount allocated by the dictators remain when
we use the probit estimator (with robust standard errors) to examine the incidence of giving
instead. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 we see that participants in the BDG are no more
or less likely to given compared to our replication of HMcS but when they have to earn their
endowments they are approximately 20% less likely to give. The demographics suggest that
participants with higher GPAs are less likely to give, older students are more likely to give,
and women are 20% more likely to give than men. That said the important result is that
participants that measure high in ADHD do not just give more money away, they are also
7more likely to give.3 A standard deviation increase in impulsivity predicts a 10% increase
in the likelihood of giving.4
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bilateral -0.22 -0.28 -0.005 -0.009
(1.17) (1.06) (0.11) (0.12)
Earned Endowment -2.59 -2.09 -0.20 -0.18
(1.25)** (1.13)* (0.10)* (0.11)
GPA -5.29 -3.65 -0.62 -0.54
(1.85)*** (1.70)** (0.20)*** (0.20)***
SAT Score (hundreds) 0.70 0.30 0.08 0.06
(0.50) (0.50) (0.05) (0.06)
Female 2.28 1.82 0.20 0.18
(0.95)** (0.85)** (0.09)** (0.09)**
Number of Siblings 0.66 0.42 0.03 0.02
(0.43) (0.40) (0.04) (0.04)
First Born 1.15 0.60 0.13 0.11
(0.95) (0.86) (0.09) (0.09)
Age 0.77 0.85 0.09 0.10
(0.42)* (0.39)** (0.04)** (0.04)**
Economics Major -1.38 -0.60 -0.14 -0.10
(0.96) (0.91) (0.09) (0.09)
Work Part Time 0.99 0.66 0.09 0.07





Observations 111 111 111 111
Pseudo R
2 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.25
TABLE 2: THE DETERMINANTS OF SENDING AND ALLOCATIONS
Notes: * indicates significant at the 10% level, ** 5%, *** 1%.  Columns (1) and (2) are the 
results of tobit regressions censored at zero.  Columns (3) and (4) report the marginal effects 
from probit regressions with robust standard errors.
Dependent Variable is Amount 
Sent
Dependent Variable is 1 if 
Amount Sent > 0
5D i s c u s s i o n
We conduct an experiment that challenges the standard, social preference, interpretation of
choices in the double blind DG. In our bilateral treatment both groups of participants are
3In both cases the BDG and earned endowment BDG coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 10%
level or better, even though the earned endowment coeﬃcient is itself not signiﬁcant in column (4).
4Again, neither of the impulsivity — treatment interactions are signiﬁcant.
8endowed with $20, any fraction of which they can pass to a randomly determined player
in the other group. Because both groups have $20 to start, neither inequality aversion nor
altruism should motivate people to give. Despite this, the allocations in this treatment are
identical to our replication of the standard double DG implying that altruism might be
the wrong interpretation of giving in the DG. Instead, we hypothesize that giving in the
double blind DG might be driven by participants coming to the lab ready “to play.” The
fact that there is a strong correlation between participant responses to an attention deﬁcit,
hyperactivity disorder questionnaire and both the rate and level of giving provides direct
support for this hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that participants who score higher on the
ADHD scale are signiﬁcantly more likely to give and give signiﬁcantly more. While it is
likely that “coming to play” biases our interpretation of behavior in games like the DG, we
also show in a third treatment that having participants earn their endowments reduces the
amount of “coming to play” substantially. As a practical matter, earned endowments should
probably become more common.
While the case for impulsive behavior in the DG is strong, we also think that the degree to
which impulsivity or “coming to play” matters in the DG depends on the protocol, speciﬁcally
the context in which the recipient is portrayed — is there a reason to give? Compared to
the double blind DG conducted in the sterile lab between students, the protocol of Eckel
and Grossman (1996) in which students make donations to the Red Cross seems more likely
to create an environment in which altruism displaces impulsivity, at least to some degree.
Similarly, the protocol of Fong (2005) in which the recipients were demonstrably poor or the
fact that Benz and Meier (2005) ﬁnd some correlation between lab giving and giving in the
real world give us more conﬁdence that they are measuring diﬀerences in social preference.
The problem of “coming to play” surely aﬀects behavior in other context-poor lab ex-
periments. For example, the third party punishment version of the DG run by Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004) in which there is a third participant whose job is to monitor and punish
the dictator based on how much she gives to the second party might overstate the likeli-
hood of third party intervention because the only way the third party can participate is
by punishing the dictator. Fehr and Fischbacher report a 60% rate of intervention but in
a social dilemma setting in which third parties also made contributions to a public good,
Carpenter and Matthews (2005) report an intervention rate of only 10%. In general, we
think that people should be wary of experiments that seem too “clean” if the cleanliness
comes from severe restrictions in the ways in which people participate. Another way of
putting this is that economic experiments may be the only domain in which Say’s law (the
colloquial version) applies. Simply supplying choices to subjects in experiments may create
a demand for behavior if that behavior is the only way to participate. Instead of demand
eﬀects, experimenters might start worrying about “supply eﬀects.”
6 Appendix — Experimental instructions in the bilat-
eral and earned endowment treatments and the ADHD
scale (borrowed from Young, 2004)
INSTRUCTIONS
9PAYMENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY
You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment. For your participation
today you will receive an amount of money that will depend on the decisions participants
make in the experiment. This amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Today’s experiment will be conducted according to a double-blind protocol. This means
that no one (including the other participants and the people conducting the experiment) will
ever be able to match your decisions to you speciﬁcally. In this experiment each of you will
be randomly paired with another person. You will not be told who this person is and the
other person will not be told who you are, either during or after the experiment.
THE EXPERIMENT
After we ﬁnish reading the instructions together, you will be randomly split into two
groups, group A and group B. The groups will be separated, and each of the participants
will start with an envelope containing $20 in cash. [Earned endowment: This $20 is the
money you earned during the ﬁrst stage of the experiment.] When called on, a participant
will go into the adjoining room alone to decide how much of this $20 (s)he wants to transfer
to someone at random in the other group. Each of you will make this decision without
knowing how much you will receive from the other group. When both groups are ﬁnished,
you will receive an envelop containing the amount transferred to you from someone in the
other group.
Your ﬁnal payment will be:
$20 — amount you transfer + amount transferred to you.
Let’s now go through the procedures in more detail. At the beginning of the experiment
everyone will receive an opaque envelope containing $20 in cash and a slip of paper that
has your participant number written on it. To protect your anonymity, do not reveal this
number to anyone (even the people running the experiment). When called on you will go to
the adjoining room to privately make your choice of how much money to transfer to someone
in the other group. Remove from the envelope the amount of money that you want to keep.
Any money left in the envelope will be transferred to the other participant. After making
your decision you will place your envelop in the box near the front of the room.
When you have made your decision you will be given a survey to ﬁll out while the other
participants make their decisions. Write your participant number on the top of the survey,
ﬁll out the survey, and then place it back in the opaque envelope that it came in. Your
participant number will link your survey responses to your envelope, but nobody (including
the people running the experiment) will ever be able to link you to your participant number.
After everyone has ﬁnished allocating money, the people running the experiment will
take the two boxes (one from each group) that contain the opaque envelopes into the hall to
record the amounts transferred. They will then bring the box from group A to group B and
vice-versa. One at a time each participant will then go to the front of the room to randomly
receive an envelope from the other group and turn in his or her survey.
Are there any questions?
ADHD SCALE
For the following statements, please circle the response that best ﬁts.
Never (1) Some-times (3) Most of the time (5)
101. Have you failed to ﬁnish things you have started?
2. Have you been constantly ﬁdgeting?
3. Have you been inattentive, easily distracted?
4. Have you made careless mistakes in your work or activities?
5. Have you had diﬃculty sustaining attention?
6. Have you not listened when people spoke to you directly?
7. Have you not understood instructions?
8. Have you had diﬃculty organizing tasks and activities?
9. Have you avoided tasks that require sustained mental eﬀort?
10. Have you been reluctant to do tasks that require sustained mental eﬀort?
11. Have you disliked doing tasks requiring sustained mental eﬀort?
12. Have you lost items necessary for tasks or activities?
13. Have you been distracted by events happening around you?
14. Have you been forgetful in daily activities?
15. Have you ﬁdgeted with your hands or squirmed in your seat?
16. Have you left your seat in situations where remaining seated is expected (e.g. in the
cinema)
17. Have you had diﬃculty with quiet leisure activities?
18. Have you felt ‘on the go’ or often acted as if driven by a motor?
19. Have you talked excessively?
20. Have you blurted out answers before questions have been completed?
21. Have you had diﬃculty waiting your turn?
22. Have you interrupted or intruded on others?
23. Have you daydreamed?
24. Have you had diﬃculty concentrating?
25. Have you engaged in attention seeking behavior?
26. Have you lacked caution and acted in a dare-devilish way?
27. Have you felt as if you can’t be bothered?
28. Have you felt bored and disinterested?
29. Have you been neat, tidy and organized?
30. Have you acted without thinking?
31. Have you behaved in a childish way?
32. Have you been able to sit comfortably through a movie or TV show?
33. Have you been able to remain seated at the dinner table?
34. Have you felt as though you were over-excited, as if you were ‘ﬂying’ or going too
fast?
35. Have you planned things ahead of time?
36. Have you had diﬃculty scheduling things on time?
37. Have you been late for appointments?
38. Have you jumped from task to task without ﬁnishing the ﬁrst?
39. Have you put oﬀ diﬃcult projects?
40. Have you procrastinated and complained?
41. Have you spoken out before thinking?
42. Have you made impetuous decisions?
43. Have you acted without thinking (e.g., impulse buying)?
1144. Have you sought out excessive excitement and thrills?
45. Have you been able to focus on tasks and activities when necessary?
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